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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
The State commenced forfeiture proceedings of money 
found on Petitioner Goodson during a search in January of 1988. 
Forfeiture petition was filed in February. Due to inability to 
serve Petitioner and other matters, an Answer was not filed until 
May. On September 9th a non-jury trial was held. Judgment 
allowing forfeiture was entered on October 13, 1988. This Appeal 
was filed November 3, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Are Plea Bargain agreements enforceable? 
Should the State be estopped from forfeiting seized 
funds and breaching its plea bargain agreement when 
Petitioners justifiably relied to their detriment 
thereon? 
In order to support a forfeiture, is the State required 
to produce some evidence that funds are cocaine-related 
once Petitioner has rebutted presumption that funds in 
proximity to cocaine are cocaine-related? 
Should forfeiture proceedings be dismissed when a 
hearing is not held within the statutorily prescribed 
twenty days and prejudice to Petitioner has resulted? 
May illegally seized money be forfeited? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 7, 1988, Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputies 
executed a Search Warrant for the premises at 1545 South Green 
Street #2, Salt Lake Cityf Utah (TR5). Petitioner Goodson was 
visiting the apartment at the time of the search (TR5). Although 
the warrant did not name Goodson, he was searched (TR 10). 
Sheriff's Deputies found on Goodson a small amount of cocaine and 
nine thousand one hundred and ninety-nine dollars in cash. The 
State charged Goodson with possession of a controlled substance 
and sought to forfeit the funds. 
A Plea Bargain agreement was entered into with the Salt 
Lake County Attorney. It was: 
Defendant would plead guilty to a Class A 
Misdemeanor. 
All other charges would be dismissed. 
No other charges would be brought for activity to 
the date of plea. 
The State would waive its right of elocution at 
sentencing (TR 23). 
Goodson requested as part of the plea bargain that the 
seized funds be returned. The Deputy County Attorney refused but 
did agree to not start forfeiture proceedings until Goodson1s 
attorney, Petitioner Leedy, could assert and perfect an 
attorney's lien on the money (TR 23). 
Prior to the plea or consummation of the agreement, new 
charges were brought against Goodson. Another plea agreement was 
reached: 
Goodson would plead to a felony. 
All other charges would be dismissed. 
No other charges would be brought for conduct to 
date of plea. 
State would waive its right of elocution at 
sentencing. 
A "No Bail" warrant issued for Goodson would be 
recalled and he could be released on $10,000 
bail. 
The funds, nine thousand one hundred and ninety-
nine dollars, seized in the earlier case would be 
released to Richard J. Leedy, Petitioner and 
Goodson1s attorney for attorney's fees (TR 24). 
This time Petitioner, as part of the plea bargain 
agreement, insisted that the seized money be returned. The 
Deputy County Attorney agreed. 
A written Stipulation embodying the term that the 
seized money be released to Richard J. Leedy was prepared and 
executed by the Deputy County Attorney (TR 24). A Court Order 
was entered directing the Sheriff to deliver the seized money to 
Petitioner (TR 28). Mr. Goodson performed the plea bargain 
agreement. He pled guilty to one felony, was sentenced and 
surrendered in execution of the sentence; performed the 
conditions of probation and is now satisfactorily on probation. 
The State performed all but one condition of the plea 
bargain. 
It dismissed all charges but one felony. 
It brought no other charges for conduct to date of 
plea. 
It waived its right of elocution at sentencing. 
Goodson was released from jail pending sentencing 
on $10,000 bond. 
It did not release the seized funds to Petitioner 
Leedy. 
Upon being served with a Court Order to release the 
funds to Leedy, the Sheriff refused and the County Attorney 
proceeded with forfeiture (TR 26). 
Although Petitioners filed their Verified Answers in 
May of 1988, a hearing was not held until September and no 
Judgment until October. 
At the hearing the Sheriff's Deputies testified that 
the money seized was found in proximity to cocaine but they could 
not testify it was cocaine-related (TR 3-14). Goodson testified 
he won the money gambling in Wendover, Nevada (TR 15Z). He 
testified he was accompanied by Lisa Martinez who could 
corroborate his testimony that he won the money gambling. 
However Ms. Martinez was not available as a witness as she had 
moved to Green Bay, Wisconsin. But if the hearing had been held 
within twenty (20) days of the Answer, as the statute requires, 
Lisa Martinez would have been available, would have testified, 
and would have corroborated Goodson that he won the money 
gambling (TR 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner Appellant contends that the forfeiture 
proceedings should have been dismissed and the seized funds 
released to him for five reasons. 
1. A valid enforceable plea bargain agreement was 
entered into with the County Attorney requiring release of funds 
to Appellant Leedy—Appellants performed all parts of the plea 
bargain and Respondents should be required to do likewise, 
2. Appellants justifiably relied to their detriment on 
the County Attorney's promise to release the seized funds to 
Appellant and Respondent should be estopped from forfeiting the 
funds and breaching its agreement. 
3. Forfeiture should have been dismissed when the 
State offered no evidence that the seized funds were cocaine 
related and the Appellants rebutted the presumption that funds 
found in proximity to cocaine are forfeitable with testimony 
that the funds were proceeds from legal gambling. 
4. Forfeiture proceedings should have been dismissed 
when a hearing was not held within twenty (20) days as the 
statute requires and prejudice resulted. 
5. The State should not be allowed to profit by 
forfeiting funds that were illegally seized. 
POINT I 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENTS ARE ENFORCEABLE 
There is no question that the County Attorney's Office 
entered into a plea bargain agreement with petitioners and one of 
the terms and conditions of that agreement entailed the payment 
to petitioner attorney of the nine thousand one hundred and 
ninety-nine dollars ($9,199.00) seized from the other petitioner. 
The evidence before the Court was that a plea 
agreement had been reached which included the following terms: 
1. Defendant Goodson would plead guilty to one felony 
count which had a ten year prison term for 
punishment. 
2. All other felony charges against Goodson would be 
dismissed. 
3. No other charges would be brought against Goodson 
for conduct to the date of plea. 
4. The State would waive its right of elocution at 
sentencing. 
5. The "No Bail" warrant against Goodson would be 
recalled and he would be released from jail until 
sentencing on $10,000.00 bail. 
6. Nine thousand one hundred and ninety-nine dollars 
($9,199.00) seized from Mr. Goodson would be given 
to his attorney Petitioner Richard Leedy. (TR 23-
25) 
The State did not dispute the plea bargain agreement. 
Moreover, portions of the plea bargain agreement — including the 
portion relating to the release of funds--were reduced to 
writing. There was a signed Stipulation by the Deputy County 
Attorney allowing the seized funds to be delivered to petitioner 
Richard J. Leedy. (TR 29-25, 28) 
Not only was there a signed Stipulation but a Court 
Order based on the Stipulation that ordered the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff to deliver the seized funds to petitioner. (TR 25, 28) 
The Sheriff refused to obey the Order (TR 26). 
All parts of the plea bargain agreement were performed 
by Goodson. The State performed all parts of the plea bargain 
agreement except releasing the funds to Petitioner. 
The law is clear that a plea bargain agreement 
constitutes an enforceable contract (21 AMJur 2d Criminal Law 
Section 485, pg. 794-796.) A proper remedy for breach of a plea 
bargain agreement is specific performance or, in this case, 
requiring the State to deliver the seized funds to Petitioner, 
Ibid; Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214; United States ex rel 
Selikoff v. Commissioner of Corrections, 524 f. 2d 650 Cert. 
denied 425 U.S. 951. 
POINT II 
ESTOPPEL - THE STATE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM FORFEITING 
THE SEIZED FUNDS AND BREACHING ITS PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT 
Equitable Estoppel is where a person—or state in this 
instance—is precluded from asserting a right—right to forfeit— 
because of its conduct or promise. See 31 C.J.S. Section 59 
Equitable Estoppel page 367. Estoppel arises when a person 
justifiably relies to his detriment on the promise of another 
Ibid; Restatement Contracts Section 90. The promise or conduct 
in this case is the plea bargain agreement and the provision that 
the seized funds would be released. 
Detrimental Reliance—Petitioner Goodson relied on the 
State's promise to release the seized funds when he hired his 
attorney. He testified he would not have hired the attorney he 
did or promise him the fee he promised but for the State's 
promise to deliver the funds. (TR 20). Goodson1s attorney 
Petitioner Leedy relied on the State's promise by sending his 
personal funds to Goodson so he could return to Salt Lake City to 
face the charges and perform the plea bargain agreement. Leedy 
testified that after reaching an agreement for the release of the 
seized money and obtaining a signed Stipulation to that effect, 
he telegraphed his personal funds of approximately twelve hundred 
dollars to Goodson (TR 25-26). Goodson needed money to travel 
and money to pay fines in Nevada before he could return to Salt 
Lake City and perform the plea bargain. Leedy also testified he 
would not have entered his appearance in the new cases or 
undertaken Goodson1s representation but for the State's agreement 
to not forfeit and release the seized funds (TR 26). 
Justifiable - Was the reliance Justifiable? Petitioners 
would argue that it is always justifiable to rely on the State's 
promise. Additionally, Petitioner Leedy had made similar plea 
bargain agreements under similar circumstances in other cases and 
the County Attorney had always previously kept his word (TR 31). 
Thus, there was justifiable detrimental reliance by both 
Petitioners that the seized funds would be released and therefore, 
the State should be estopped from forfeiting said funds. 
POINT III 
THE PRESUMPTION THAT MONEY IN PROXIMITY TO COCAINE 
IS COCAINE-RELATED AND FORFEITABLE IS REBUTTABLE AND 
ONCE REBUTTED, IT BECOMES THE STATEfS BURDEN TO PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE THAT THE FUNDS ARE COCAINE-RELATED 
Section 58-37-13(1)(g) Utah Code Annotated provides; 
"Everything of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance 
and all moneys . . . used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this act (shall be 
forfeitable). 
There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, 
coins and currency found in close proximity to 
forfeitable controlled substances are forfeitable." 
(emphasis added) The burden of proof shall be upon 
Claimants of the property to rebut this presumption." 
Sheriff's Deputy Kendra Herlin testified the money was 
found in Charles Goodson!s pocket as was a small amount of 
suspected cocaine. (TR 10) There was also a small amount of 
suspected cocaine on a table near where Goodson sat (TR 6-7). 
That raised the presumption. To rebut the presumption, 
Petitioner testified that the money was obtained from gambling in 
Wendover, Nevada (TR 15). 
The State put on no evidence that the money was cocaine 
related; i.e., "furnished in exchange for a controlled substance" 
or "used to facilitate any violation of the act." In fact the 
State produced no further evidence. 
By statute the Court is to make its determination by a 
"preponderance of the evidence," Section 58-37-13(f) Utah Code 
Ann. Even though the Court may not have believed Petitioner 
Goodson that he won the money gambling, there was no evidence to 
support a finding of cocaine-related—let alone a preponderance. 
The only evidence was that a substance suspected to be cocaine 
was found in one pocket while money was found in another. It 
may be noted that the possession charges against Mr. Goodson were 
dismissed as part of the plea bargain. 
POINT IV 
FAILURE TO HAVE THE HEARING WITHIN THE STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED 
TWENTY DAYS RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO PETITIONERS AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN THE BASIS FOR DISMISSING THE FORFEITURE 
The seizure of a person's money without notice and 
without a hearing runs closely afoul the due process requirements 
of the federal and state Constitution. In similar circumstances 
the United States Supreme Court has allowed seizure procedures to 
pass constitutional muster if a hearing is granted soon after 
seizure--such as replevin—prejudgment attachment and garnishment. 
In the present case, the Utah Legislature attempted to 
avoid an unconstitutional taking by providing for an early 
hearing after seizure. Section 58-37-13(g) Utah Code Annotated 
provides "Whenever an Answer to a Complaint or Petition appears 
of record . . . the Court shall set the matter for hearing within 
twenty days." 
The Answer or Petitioner's claim was filed May 26th of 
1988. The hearing was held on September 9, 1988 and the Judgment 
did not come down for sometime after that. More than three 
months elapsed--not the statutory twenty days. 
In State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave) 717 P.2d. 1338 
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that prejudice plus the 
passage of more than one hundred twenty days would be grounds to 
dismiss the forfeiture and give the claimants the property. 
In this case, Petitioner Goodson testified that Lisa 
Martinez was with him in Wendover, Nevada and could corroborate 
his testimony about winning the seized money gambling (TR 15-16). 
Lisa Martinez had moved to Wisconsin and was not available as a 
witness (TR 16). However, she would have been available had the 
hearing been within 20 days as prescribed by statute (TR 16-17). 
POINT V 
THE SEIZURE OF THE MONEY IN THIS CASE WAS THE RESULT 
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND TO ALLOW FORFEITURE WOULD GIVE 
THE STATE THE FRUIT OF THE POISON TREE 
The Sheriffs entered the apartment where Goodson and the 
money were found with a search warrant (TR 4 and 5). The warrant 
was only for the premises, not Goodson1s person (TR 5, 13). While 
executing that warrant they searched Goodson's person and found 
the money (TR 10). Such search and seizure is illegal. Officers 
may not search a person on a premises with a warrant only for the 
premises. (State vs. Vanholten, Utah Court of Appeals, 860 369-
, May 2, 1988.) To allow forfeiture would grant the State 
the poison fruit of its illegal search. 
POINT VI 
THE STATE MAY NOT FORFEIT ALL OF A DRUG SUSPECT'S 
PROPERTY SO THAT HE IS UNABLE TO EXERCISE 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE 
May the State forfeit all of a drug suspect's property 
so that he is unable to retain an attorney of his choice? There 
is no Utah state law or case interpreting the Utah Constitution. 
The Circuits are split. See U.S. v. Harvey, 814 f.2d 637, 837 
f.2d 637 (en banc), (4th Cir 1988), U.S. vs. Monsanto, 836 f.2d 74 
852 f.2d 1400 (en banc) (1988), U.S. Thier 801 f.2d 1463 (1986 5th 
Cir); U.S. v. Nichols 841 f.2d 1485 (10th Cir 1988). The United 
States Supreme Court has now granted certiorar; in the Monsanto 
case, supra to decide the issue under the federal Constitution. 
Appellant Goodson testified he had no assets or income and that 
since the County Attorney had not kept his promise, he had no 
funds with which to pay his attorney. Appellant would argue that 
that rationale of the forfeiture laws is to prohibit a person 
from profiting from drug trafficking. But the exercise of one's 
constitutional right is not profiting and therefore, forfeiture 
to the extent it interferes with one's ability to exercise his 
constitutional right to counsel of his choice should not be 
allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be reversed and Petitioners awarded 
the seized funds. 
DATED this <^ day of March, 1989. 
RICHARD J./EEEDY 
Attorney/for Defendant/Appellant 
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